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Abstract 
Automatic intel~gent agents i~abiting a shared environment must coordinate their activities. 
Cooperation-not merely coordination-may improve the performance of the individual agents or 
the overall behavior of the system they form. Research in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) 
addresses the problem of designing automated intelligent systems which interact effectively. DA1 
is not the only field to take on the challenge of understanding cooperation and coordination. There 
are a variety of other multi-entity environments in which the entities coordinate their activity and 
cooperate. Among them are groups of people, animals, particles, and computers. We argue that 
in order to address the challenge of building coo~nated and collabom~d intelligent agents, it is 
beneficial to combine AI techniques with methods and techniques from a range of muIti-entity 
fields, such as game theory, operations research, physics and philosophy. To support his claim, we 
describe some of our projects, where we have successfully taken an interdisciplinary approach. 
We demomtrate the benefits in applying multi-entity methodologies and show the adaptations, 
modifications and extensions necessary for solving the DA1 problems. @ 1997 Elsevier Science 
B.V. 
~ey~ur~~~ Dis~buted Artificial Intelligence; Multi-agent systems; Cooperation; Negotiation 
1. Introduction 
One of the greatest challenges for computer science is building computer systems that 
can work together. The integration of automated systems has always been a challenge, 
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but as computers have become more sophisticated, the demands for coordination and 
cooperation have become more critical. It is not only basic level components such as 
printers, disks, and CPUs, but also high-level complex systems that need to coordinate 
and cooperate. 
Examples of such intelligent systems include: 
l automated agents that monitor electricity transformation networks [ 321; 
l teams of robotic systems acting in hostile environments [5]; 
l computational agents that facilitate distributed design and engineering [ 541; 
l distributed transportation and planning systems [ 25,561; 
l intelligent agents that negotiate over meeting scheduling options on behalf of people 
for whom they work [67]; and 
l Internet agents that collaborate to provide updated information to their users. 
In these environments, even when coordination is not required, cooperation may improve 
the performance of the individual agents or the overall behavior of the system they 
form. 
Problems of coordination and cooperation are not unique to computer systems, but 
exist at multiple levels of activity in a wide range of populations. People pursue their 
own goals through communication and cooperation with other people or machines. Ani- 
mals interact (with limited language), cooperate with each other, and form communities. 
Particles interact with each other and compose different types of material and phases 
of matter. Although most computers currently act in multicomputer environments, the 
interaction among them is generally restricted, and they interact under strict rules. Ne- 
gotiation or other sophisticated interactions rarely occur among computers. In general, 
the levels of negotiation, bidding, voting, and other sophisticated interactions that char- 
acterize natural coordinating systems are absent. 
Recent research in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) aims to increase the 
power, efficiency, and flexibility of intelligent automated systems (agents) by develop- 
ing sophisticated techniques for communication and cooperation among them. In my 
research, I have addressed the challenge of building coordinated and collaborated intel- 
ligent agents by combining AI techniques with methods and techniques from various 
fields that study multi-entity behavior. 
I argue that an interdisciplinary approach is beneficial for the development of coordi- 
nated and cooperative intelligent agents. Because these fields, which study multi-entity 
behavior, are not concerned with agent design, one might think that they are not relevant 
for DAI. Our experience is quite the contrary. It is true that these fields do not solve AI 
problems, but they have thought about a wide range of issues that are important to the 
design of intelligent agents, and they provide techniques, sometimes with proven proper- 
ties or methods for proving properties that are useful to adopt for designing agents. DAI 
researchers still have a lot of work left in order to adapt these methods for their needs; 
however, they do not need to start from scratch. In this paper, we show by example the 
advantages and the challenges of building on other work. 
The amount of work done in the related fields is overwhelming. Thus, a major 
challenge in taking an interdisciplinary approach is determining which technique to use. 
There are several parameters that influence the choice of the appropriate techniques for 






S. Kraus/Artificial Intelligence 94 (1997) 79-97 81 
Lie level of cooperation among the agents: cooperative agents which work to- 
ward satisfying the same goal versus agents which are self-motivate and try to 
maximize their own benefits. ’ There are intermediary cases where self-motivated 
agents join together to work toward a joint goal. 
Regulations and protocols: environments where the designers of the agents can 
agree on regulations and protocols for the agents’ interaction versus situations 
with no pre-defined regulations and protocols. 
Number of agents: a very large number of agents (hundred or more) versus a 
few agents which communicate and coordinate their actions. 
Type of agents: systems of automated agents versus systems composed of people 
and automated agents. 
C~~~~ni~at~on and computation costs: the availability and cost of communica- 
tion among the agents and their computation capabilities and costs. 
Any DA1 task can be characterized according to these dimensions. This characteriza- 
tion guides the choice of the multi-entity technique that can be applied to the specific 
task. 
Consider the deveIopment of automated agents for buying and selling items on the 
Web, such as clothes and furniture. Suppose there are several enterprises, each with 
several kinds of goods which they sell to users or to other enterprises. Each enterprise 
has intelligent seller and buyer agents. The job of the seller agent is to sell the enterprise’s 
goods to other enterprises through their buyer agents or to users. The job of a buyer 
agent is to obtain from other enterprises the goods that are missing ffom the stock of 
its enterprise. Several different DA1 problems may arise in such a fr~ework: 
in the interaction between two automated agents belonging to different enter- 
prises, the agents are self-motivated, but may benefit from cooperation. The 
designers of the agents may agree upon regulations for the interaction, the num- 
ber of agents of each interaction is limited, and they can communicate and have 
computation capabilities. 
A seller agent of an enterprise may try to sell some goods to a person. In this 
case, the person will prefer a non-structured interaction, and it is more difficult 
to set regulations and protocols for the interaction in advance. 
Two agents of the same enterprise may work together toward the same goal: 
increasing the benefits of their enterprise. In this case, the agents are cooperative, 
regulations and protocols can be set in advance, the number of agents is limited, 
they are automated, and they can communicate. 
In each of these three cases, there is a different multi-entity technique that should be 
applied. 
In this paper, we will examine different DAI tasks and will discuss the application of 
game-theoretic techniques (Section 2), physics models (Section 3), operations research 
methods (Section 4)) and informal models of cooperation and coordination (Section 5) 
to DAI environments. 
2 Research in DAI is divided into two basic classes: distributes Problem Solving (DPS) and belts-Agent 
Systems (M.4) [ 61. Cooperative agents belong to the DPS class, while self-motivated agents belong to the 
MA class. 
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2. The application of game-theoretic techniques to multi-agent environments 
Researchers in DA1 have considered problems related to task allocation and resource 
sharing where the agents are self-motivated, as in the following examples: 
o situations where airplanes belonging to different airlines need to share the limited 
resources of the same airport, and it is necessary to find a mechanism that will give 
priority to planes with less fuel on board [ 611; 
o an electronic market populated with automated agents which represent different 
enterprises and buy and sell (e.g., [8,17,74]); 
o transportation centers that deliver packages and may cooperate to reduce expenses 
[641; 
o info~ation servers that form coalitions for answering queries [ 361; and 
o intelligent agents that negotiate over meeting scheduling options on behalf of people 
for whom they work [67]. 
Using the five criteria presented in the Introduction to characterize these examples, 
we observe that in these examples the agents are self-motivated and try to maximize 
their own benefits. The designers of the agents may agree in advance on regulations 
and protocols for the agents’ interaction, In each interaction the number of agents is 
usually small (less than a dozen agents) ; there are only automated agents which can 
communicate and have computational capabilities. 
In such situations we recommend the application of game-theoretic techniques. Game 
theory studies mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between people. The 
models of game theory are highly abstract representations of classes of real life situations 
that involve individuals who have different goals or preferences [49] _ The active entity 
in all game-theoretic models is a player. Game-theoretic models are divided into two 
main types: “noncooperative” models, in which the sets of possible actions of individual 
players are primitives, and “cooperative” models, in which the sets of possible joint 
actions of groups of players are primitive [53]. 
The abstract models of game theory can be used as a basis for the agents’ in- 
teraction protocols, when the designers of the agents agree to use them. Automated 
agents in a DAI framework can be modeled by players of game-theoretic models. 
Since it is assumed in game theory that the players are self-motivated, so should 
the agents be in the environments where these techniques are applied. DA1 addresses 
both situations in which each individual agent acts by itself (e.g., [17,61,67]), thus 
calling for the application of noncooperative models, and situations in which tasks 
require that groups of agents work together (e.g., [ 36,641)) thus calling for coop- 
erative models. In the first case, game-theoretic models are appropriate when there 
is only a handful of agents, and, in the second case, game theory may be applied 
to a few dozens of agents. The use of game-theoretic techniques requires substan- 
tial computations, and, communication capabilities are also usually needed. The ex- 
amples described in the beginning of the section, as well as other situations that 
satisfy these criteria, are cases where applying game-theoretic techniques by DA1 
researchers should be considered. We have applied both noncooperative and coop- 
erative gee-th~retic models to DA1 situations. We briefly describe these attempts 
here. 
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2.1. Use of a strategic model of negotiation for resource sharing and task distribution 
We first consider situations where a small number of self-motivated agents need to 
share resources or can benefit from task distribution. In these situations, inter-agent 
cooperation can be enhanced using negotiation strategies that enable agents to commu- 
nicate their respective desires and to compromise in order to reach mutually beneficial 
agreements. 
The game-theoretic strategic approach to the bargaining problem3 provides a useful 
foundation for designing such capabilities in systems. In this approach, agents’ negoti- 
ating maneuvers are moves in a noncooperative game, and the rationality assumption of 
the negotiators [ 301 is expressed by using the Nash Equilibrium concept. 4 Our main 
goal in this research was to define an acceptable protocol for the interactions among the 
agents and to identify strategies for the agents p~icipating in the negotiation. These 
methods are applicable in the following example. 
Example 1 (Data allocation in multi-agent environments). There is a set of several 
(more than two) information servers in the environment which are connected by a 
communication network. Each server is located in a different g~graphical area and 
receives queries from clients in its area. In response to a client’s query, a server sends 
back information stored locally or information stored in another server, which it retrieves 
from that server. 5 The information is clustered in datasets. 6 
When a set of new datasets arrives, each new dataset has to be allocated to one 
of the servers by mutual agreement among all of them. However, each server has its 
own interests and wants to maximize its own utility, and thus the servers may be in 
conflict concerning where to locate the new datasets. Furthermore, the servers have no 
common interest and no central controller which can be used to resolve such conflicts. 
We propose that these conflicts will be resolved via negotiations. In particular, we 
propose a strategic negotiation model that takes into account the passage of time during 
the negotiation process itself in order to solve this problem. 
Our negotiation protocol is a process that may include several iterations. We assume 
that servers can take actions in the negotiation only at certain times in the set Time = 
(0, I, 2,. . .} that are fixed in advance and ordered (randomly). In each period t E Time, 
if the neg~~tiation has not terminated earlier, a server whose turn it is to make an offer 
at time t, will suggest a possible allocation for all the datasets considered, and each of 
the other servers may either accept the offer or reject it or opt out of the negotiation. 
If an offer is accepted by all the servers, then the negotiation ends, and this offer is 
implemented. If at least one of the servers opts out, then the negotiation ends. If no 
server has opted out, but at least one of the servers has rejected the offer, the negotiation 
3 Introductory books on game theory that discuss approaches tobargaining include [21,47,49,53]. 
4A pair of strategies (CT, T) is a Nash Equilibrium if, given 7, no strategy of Agent 1 results in an outcome 
that Agent 1 prefers to the outcome generated by (CT, T), and similarly for Agent 2, given (T. 
5A specific example of such a distributed knowledge system is the Data and information System component 
of the Earth Observing System (EOSDJS) of NASA [50]. It is a distributed system which supports the 
archiving and dis~bution of data at multiple and inde~ndent data centers. 
4 A dataset corresponds to a clusrer in information retrieval, and to afile in the file allocation problem. 
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proceeds to period t + 1, and the next server makes a counter-offer, the other servers 
respond, and so on. 
Using this negotiation mechanism, we showed that the servers have simple and stable 
negotiation strategies that result in efficient agreements without delays. We have proved 
that our methods yield better esults than the static allocation policy currently used for 
data allocation for servers in distributed systems. 
The main question is, in general, what is the advantage of using game-theoretic 
models for such problems, and what must be done in order to adapt them to DAI 
environments. The strategic bargaining theory provides general frameworks for modeling 
negotiation, but to apply them to the design of agents, we needed to address five 
problems: choosing a strategic bargaining model which is applicable for the specific 
DAI problem; matching the DAI scenarios with the game-theoretic definitions of the 
chosen model; identifying equilibrium strategies; developing low complexity techniques 
for searching for appropriate strategies; and providing utility functions. 
For example, for the data allocation problem described in Example 1, we have chosen 
Rubinstein’s model of Alternative Offers [ 621. 7 The main property of this model is that 
it takes into consideration the passage of time during the negotiation. This is useful for 
environments of Example 1 since for a server participating in the negotiation process, the 
time when an agreement is reached is very important. ’ The model of Alternative Offers 
provides formal definitions of players, possible agreements, the protocol of alternative 
offers, and the notion of strategies. In order to apply these concepts to the data allocation 
problem, we had to match the world state and formal definitions and modify them. For 
example, in the data allocation scenario, a player is a server and an agreement is a 
distribution of datasets to information servers. 
Game theory proposes different notions of equilibria that capture different aspects of 
stability. Given specific assumptions about the environments, game theory researchers 
identify strategies that are in equilibrium. In order to address the third need mentioned 
above, when applying game-theoretic techniques to DA1 environments, we formalized 
the assumptions that are appropriate for our environments. For example, in the data 
allocation scenario, all agents ustain a loss over time, there is a finite (but large) set of 
agreements, and there are some agreements which are better for all agents than opting 
out of the negotiations. In most of the cases, these assumptions are different from the 
assumptions that are considered in game theory, and therefore we needed to identify the 
equilibrium strategies under the DA1 assumptions. 
The third problem mentioned above arises in DAI situations where the designer of the 
system cannot provide the automated agent with a negotiation strategy in advance. For 
example, in the data allocation scenario, finding possible dataset allocations can be done 
only after the specifications of the datasets are known to the agents and thus cannot 
’ See [ 521 for a detailed review of the bargaining ame of Alternative Offers. 
8 There are two reasons for this. Fit, there is the cost of communication and computation time spent on the 
negoti~ion. Second, there is the loss of unused info~ation: until an agreement is reached, new documents 
cannot be used. Thus, the servers wish to reach an agreement as soon as possible, since they receive payment 
for answering queries. 
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be supplied in advance by the designers. Construction of the strategies which are in 
~uilib~urn can rely on theorems proven in advance, but can be done only when the set 
of possible agreements can be defined. For such situations, there is a need to develop 
low complexity computational techniques for searching for appropriate strategies by the 
automated negotiators. The issue of the complexity involved in finding strategies i not 
discussed in the game theory literature. 
Another issue that is rarely discussed in game theory is the source of a utility function 
or a set of preferences that is needed for any decision-making. In game theory, one 
aspect of a definition of a game is the players’ utility functions or preferences, and 
it is assumed that each player knows its utility function (and has some knowledge of 
the utility function of its opponents). A designer of an automated agent is required to 
provide the agents with a utility function or a preference relation. Without doing so, the 
game-theoretic techniques cannot be used for automats agents. In the data allocation 
scenario, we have developed a complex utility function which takes into consideration 
factors su’ch as storage costs, retrieval costs, distances between servers, etc. Only then 
can we apply game-theoretic techniques. 
More details on our work on the strategic model of negotiation and the definition 
of utility functions can be found in [39,44,45,65]. In the process of developing and 
specifying the strategic model of negotiation, we have examined bilateral negotiations, as 
well as multi-agent environments (more than two agents), single encounters and multiple 
encounters, ituations characterized both by complete and incomplete information, and 
the differing impact of time on the payoffs of the participants [ 39,451. Recently, we 
have also considered problems where there are two attributes to the agr~ments 1651. 
While some combinations of these factors can result in minor delays in reaching an 
agreement, he model nevertheless reveals an important capacity for reaching agreement 
in early periods of the negotiation.9 
By creating coalitions that allow them to share resources and cooperate on task 
execution, autonomous agents may be able to increase their benefits. Cooperative game- 
theoretic models can be used to do this for self-motivated agents, each of which has 
tasks it must fulfill and resources it needs to complete these tasks. though the agents 
can act and reach goals by themselves, it may be advantageous to join together. 
For example, taxi drivers may own different types of cabs and therefore may have 
different costs, different transportation capabilities, and different resulting payoffs. Each 
taxi driver would like to increase his own benefits, but it may be in the driver’s interest 
to cooperate and form coalitions in order to achieve greater and more complex trans- 
portation capabilities. Game-theoretic coalition fo~ation theories can be used in the 
development of automated agents that represent these drivers as they form coalitions. 
Game theory [ 11,28,34,5 1,571 provides a good framework with concepts of a coali- 
tion and coalitional value and different notions of stability, but to use it, we have had 
9 In 1441, it was shown how the strategic model can be used in appfications uch as a hostage crisis 
simulation. 
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to address three tasks: the development of explicit protocols for interaction among the 
agents; the development of algorithms for coalition formation; while simultaneously 
taking into account communication costs and limited computation time. Most of the 
work in game theory does not treat these issues, but only predicts how the players will 
distribute the benefits, given a coalition configuration. 
In [68,72] we addressed the three tasks mentioned above and presented algorithms 
for coalition formation and payoff distribution in general environments. We focused on 
a low complexity Kernel-oriented [ 121 coalition formation algorithm. The properties 
of this algorithm were examined via simulations. These have shown that the model 
increases the benefits of the agents within a reasonable time period, and more coalition 
formations provide more benefits to the agents. 
3. Applying classical mechanics to large scale agent systems 
There are situations where cooperation among a large number of agents (hundred or 
more) is needed. For example, the World Wide Web (WWW) consists of millions of 
users and is still growing. Another example is the employment of hundreds of simple, 
inexpensive autonomous mobile devices to achieve military and civilian goals in ground, 
air, and underwater environments [ 221. In such situations [ 3 1,731, the agents work 
together toward satisfying a large set of joint goals, and the designers of the agents can 
agree in advance on regulations and protocols for the agents’ interaction. 
The negotiation and coalition formation methods presented in the previous section are 
suitable for environments with a relatively small number of agents. But, in very large 
agent-communities, these negotiation methods are typically too computationally com- 
plex and time-consuming. Furthermore, with hundreds of agents, direct communication 
connections between all of the agents may be impossible or too costly to establish. 
Physical models of particle-dynamics have proved useful in such settings. They use 
mathematical formulation either to describe or to predict the properties and evolution 
of different states of matter. In particular, we developed efficient techniques for coop- 
eration among hundreds of agents by adopting methods of classical mechanics used by 
physicists to tackle the problem of finding the properties of interaction among many 
particles. Although there are many differences between particles and computational 
systems, we have shown that the classical mechanics approach yields a model that 
enables feasible cooperation in very large agent-systems; the approach has a low com- 
putational complexity, which is crucial for the functioning of such systems. We have 
applied the classical mechanics-based methods to the following freight transportation 
example [ 16,63,75]. 
Example 2 (Freight transportation system). The system of freight transportation con- 
sists of many carriers (e.g., messengers on motorcycles) which belong to the same 
company, operating in a big city. Each carrier has a freight carrying capability that is 
given in units of volume and has a given location. The tasks that the carriers must fulfill 
are freight transportation tasks. We deal here with freight (e.g., packages) that should be 
moved from various locations to other locations. There are many freight transportation 
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tasks to perform, and the carriers would like to perform them as soon as possible, while 
at the same time minimi~ng the company’s expenses. 
In the above example and in the other DA1 environments that we consider, there 
is a large set of agents and a large set of goals they need to satisfy. Each agent has 
capabilities and should move toward satisfying goals. The first step in applying the 
classical nechani~s model to DA1 is the match between particles and their properties, 
agents and their capabilities, and goals and their properties. The next step is to identify 
the state of matter for modeling a community of agents and goals. The mathematical 
formulation that is used by physicists either to describe or to predict the properties and 
evolution of particles in these states of matter serve as the basis for the development 
of algorithms for the agents. However, several modifications of the classical mechanics 
model are necessary to provide an efficient algorithm for automated agents. 
In the physical world, mutual attraction between particles causes motion. The reac- 
tion of a particle to the field of potential will yield a change in its coordinates and 
energies. The change in the state of the particle is a result of the influence of the po- 
tential. For DAI, the agents calculate the attraction and move according to the results 
of these calculations. That means, in our model, that each agent calculates the effect 
of the potential field on itself by solving a set of differential equations. According 
to the results of these calculations, it moves to a new state in the goal-domain. If it 
reaches a goal, it will proceed to a goal-satisfaction process. In cases where too many 
agents fit the requirements of the same goal, some are prevented from reaching the 
goal, through the property of mutual rejection between dynamic particles. We model 
the goal-satisfaction process by a collision of dynamic particles with static particles. 
Because the properties of particle collisions are different from the properties of goal- 
satisfaction, several adjustments were made to develop efficient algorithms for agent 
systems. 
For example, in the freight ~~s~~ation system of Example 2 each piece of freight 
is modeled by a static particle and each carrier is modeled by a dynamic particle, 
since carriers move toward the task’s location. The volume of carriers’ freight carrying 
capabilities and the volume of each piece of freight are modeled by particle masses, and 
their locations by particle locations. 
The interaction between a carrier and a piece of freight is modeled by the mutual 
potential function of the modeling particles. It is calculated with respect o the distance 
between them. The potential functions derivatives yield forces which act on a dynamic 
particle and direct it. That is, the advancement towards a piece of freight is modeled 
by the movement of a dynamic particle towards a static particle. Repulsion between 
two dynamic particles which model two different carriers will influence the freight- 
task distribution among the carriers and will prevent wo carriers from proceeding to 
a piece of freight which can be moved by one carrier. The performance of a freight- 
transportation task is modeled by the collision between a static particle, which models 
the task, and a dynamic particle, which models the agent. 
In [70], we provide a detailed algorithm to be used by a single agent within the 
system. The algorithm leads to agent-goal llocation, and it converges to a solution where 
the fulfillment of goals is accomplished either by single agents or by groups of agents 
88 S, Kraus/Art$cial Intelligence 94 (1997) 79-97 
via cooperation. The computational complexity is low, and no explicit communication is 
necessary. In addition to these properties, we have proven that the algorithm we provide 
performs relatively close to the optimum. 
The physics approach has several advantages. While common DA1 algorithms must 
be checked for their validity either by a formal proof or by simulations, the models 
that are based on physics techniques can rely on theoretical and experimental results 
that are already known from physics. According to these results, one can predict the 
evolution of the modeled agent-system, since it will evolve in the same manner as a 
corresponding physical system. The local interactions, which enable one to derive the 
global behavior of the system, assure a low computational complexity of the model. In 
very large-scale agent-systems, this approach provides a model that promises emergent 
cooperative goal-satisfaction activity. In addition, the properties of the system as a whole 
can be analyzed, using concepts from statistical mechanics. The employment of such 
concepts enables us to derive the properties of a system through the properties of its 
components. 
4. Applying operations research techniques 
Many DA1 researchers have considered situations of cooperative automated agents: 
for example, several workstations working together on fulfilling tasks [ 481, multi-agent 
for integration of design, manufacturing and shop floor control activities [ 41, and coop- 
erative shipping companies [ 181. In such situations, all the agents work together toward 
the satisfaction of a joint goal; the designer of the automated agents can develop, in 
advance, protocols for cooperation between the agents; the number of agents is not large; 
and the agents can communicate and have computation capabilities. 
We recommend, in such situations, the consideration of operations research techniques. 
Researchers in operations research seek to determine how best to design and operate an 
organizational system, usually under conditions of scarce resources [ 761. 
Autonomous agents working in DPS environments can be considered as an orga- 
nizational system, and thus algorithms that were developed for human organizations 
in operations research may be applied to DAI environments. This is suitable for en- 
vironments with a few dozen agents with large computation capabilities, because the 
computational complexity of the operations research techniques is usually high, and their 
efficiency decreases with the size of the organization to which they are applied. 
We have applied operations research techniques which were developed for the set 
covering and set partitioning problems for coalition formation in DPS environments 
[ 69,711. Given a set of agents and a set of tasks which they have to satisfy, we 
consider situations where each task should be attached to a group of agents which will 
perform the task. An example is a transportation company, similar to the example in the 
previous section. The company supplies transportation services via a number of trucks, 
lift trucks, cranes, boats, and planes. The drivers belong to a cooperative and share the 
benefits equally, and thus try to maximize the overall benefits of the company. There may 
be occasions in which one vehicle cannot perform a given transportation task by itself. 
In such cases, cooperation is necessary. Therefore, several drivers will form groups, and 
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each gr0u.p will fulfill a transportation task cooperatively. If the transportation company 
has many drivers, a dist~but~ task allocation m~hanism may be advantageous. 
As we mentioned above, task allocation among agents may be approached as a 
problem of assigning groups of agents to tasks, and, therefore, the partition of the 
agents into subgroups becomes the main issue, and our problem becomes imilar to 
the Set Partitioning Problem (SPP). Set partitioning entails the partition of a set into 
subsets, and the set petitioning problem is finding such a partition that has a minimal 
cost. lo The SPP has been dealt with widely in the context of NP-hard problems 1231, 
and apptoximation algorithms were developed in operations research [ 2,3,9,10,24]. 
Among them we can find the algorithm of Chvatal [lo], which has a logarithmic ratio 
bound. ” 
The details of the algorithm that we developed, which is based on the operations 
research methods for the SPP is specified in [69]. Although the general task allocation 
problem is computationally exponential, the algorithm above is polynomial and yields 
results which are close to the optimal results and bounded by a logarithmic ratio bound. 
Another advantage of the algorithm, which is crucial in the case of a distributed system, 
is the distribution of the algorithm. We distribute the calculations in a natural way. 
That is, the dis~bution is an outcome of the algorithm ch~acte~stics, since each agent 
performs mostly those calculations that are required for its own actions during the 
process. In addition, our distribution method prevents most of the possibly overlapping 
calculations, thus saving unnecessary computational operations. 
The algorithm is an anytime algorithm. If halted before normal termination, it still 
provides the system with severai coalitions that have already formed. Since the first 
coalitions to be formed are the better ones, the results, when halted, are still of good 
quality. The anytime property of such an algorithm is important for dynamic environ- 
ments, wherein the time-period for negotiation and coalition formation processes may 
be changed uring the process. 
In another paper [SS], we considered the problem of dis~ibut~ dynamic task allo- 
cation by 3 set of cooperative agents. We modeled the agents, using a stochastic losed 
queueing network, which is a well known operations research technique. 
In both cases, we have developed polynomial algorithms that provide near optimal 
results. From our experience, we realized that in order to apply operations research 
techniques to DA& there are several steps that must be taken. First, there is the need 
to find a problem that was considered in operations research which is close to the 
DAI problem and to make a detailed match between the problems. For example, in the 
coalition formation problem described above, we realized that it is close to the SPP 
or SCP problems. Then, there is the need to adjust the operations research algorithm 
to the DAI environment. In particular, most of the operations research algorithms are 
centralized, and, since we deal with autonomous agents, we seek distribute algorithms. 
In addition, there is the need to develop utility functions that can be used by the 
agents. In operations research it is assumed that cost function is provided as part of 
lo Coalition formation where coalitions may overlap cau be approached as a Set Covering Problem (SCP) _ 
Ii An approximation algorithm for a problem has a ratio bound p(n) if p(n) is smaller than the ratio between 
the optimal cost and the approximated cost. 
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the problem (as in game theory). In our model, we need to provide the agents with 
efficient techniques to calculate them (see also [ 641) . For example, in [ 69,7 1 ] we had 
to develop the cost function and coalitional values in the context of task allocation and 
to provide a distributed algorithm to compute them. This notion of coalitional value 
is different from the notion of game-theoretic coalitional value, since here the value 
depends on the coalitional configuration and on the task allocation. 
Although adjusting the operations research techniques to DA1 situations required some 
effort, we determined that the benefits from using these well-developed methods, and 
techniques for evaluating them, may help in reaching efficient algorithms for the DA1 
environment. 
5. The application of informal models of behavioral and social sciences to 
automated agents 
There are situations where automated agents need to interact with other agents in 
non-structured environments; for example, an information server which works to form 
a multi-media document for answering a complex query of a user, agents that help 
train people in negotiation [ 441, and agents that sell goods on the World Wide Web 
[ 81. In such situations, the agents are self-motivated, and usually the automated agents 
need to interact with people. The number of agents in the environment is not large, and 
communication is possible. 
In such situations, we found that formalizing and implementing informal models of 
behavioral and social sciences can be beneficial. Behavioral and social sciences study hu- 
man cooperation and coordination and develop frameworks and models of organizations 
and communities (e.g., [ 20,46,59,60] ) . In non-structured and unpredictable environ- 
ments, heuristics for cooperation and coordination among automated agents, based on 
successful human cooperation and interaction techniques, may be useful. 
We have applied informal models to different types of environments, and we will 
discuss one of them below. Applying informal models to DA1 can be done in two ways: 
(a) using the informal models as motivation for the development of heuristics for 
the cooperative activities of the automated agents; 
(b) formalizing the informal models (e.g., using logic) and then applying them to a 
DA1 environment. 
In both cases, there is a need to carry out simulations in order to evaluate the performance 
of the techniques, since the informal models usually do not formally analyze the behavior 
of the systems. The main advantage in using these models is that we build upon 
experience and expertise that were developed over the years in the specific type of 
interactions, rather than starting from scratch and using only our own experience. Our 
success in the developments of specific applications, in particular automated negotiators 
[ 41,421, supports this claim. 
There are two main approaches in the social sciences to the development of theorems 
relating to negotiation. The first approach, which we used in Section 2.1, is the formal 
theory of bargaining. This formal game-theoretic approach provides clear analyses of 
various situations and precise results concerning the strategy a negotiator should choose. 
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However, it requires making restrictive assumptions, and the agents need to follow strict 
negotiation protocols which are not possible in some real world environments. 
The second approach, which we refer to as the negotiation guides approach, comprises 
informal theories which attempt o identify possible strategies for a negotiator and to 
assist him in achieving good results (see, for example, [ 13,19,29,33,35]). These 
negotiatmn guides do not accept he strong restrictions and assumptions presented in the 
game-theoretic models. Applying these methods to DA1 is more difficult than using the 
first approach, since there is no formal theory nor strategies that can be used. However, 
these methods can be used in domains where people interact with each other and 
with automated agents, and situations where automated agents interact in environments 
without pre defined regulations. These informal models can serve as guides for the 
development of negotiation heuristics [41] or as a basis for the development of a 
logical model of negotiation [421. 
In [ 37,411, we developed a general structure for a self-motivated negotiating Au- 
tomated Agent acting in environments where cooperation between the agents may be 
beneficial., but where conflicts among the agents can arise. There are no strict regula- 
tions and protocols for the negotiation, there is no mediator, and central controllers do 
not exist. Thus agreements are not enforced, and agents may break their promises, The 
agents have incomplete information concerning the other agents’ goals and tasks, and 
an agent can provide the other agents with false information. 
As a testbed, a specific domain was chosen, the ~i~lorn~cy game, which is rich 
enough to include most aspects of negotiation. I2 Given a (restricted version of) natural 
language which covers this domain, our agent, Diplomat, was confronted with human 
agents and even demonstrated an advantage over its human negotiation partners. 
The framework of Diplomat consists of five modules: the Prime Minister, that directs 
the Diplomat’s activities; the Ministry of Defense, that is responsible for the planning; 
the Foreign O&e, that negotiates with the other players; the Headquarters that exe- 
cutes the basic tasks of Diplomat; and the ~~teZZigence Agency, that is responsible for 
collecting information about the environment and the other players. These modules are 
implemented by a dynamic set of local agents that work together, communicate, and 
exchange messages to achieve the common general tasks of Diplomat. 
In the design of Diplomat and in choosing the negotiation heuristics it uses, we used 
different general informal negotiation guides. For example, as we mentioned above, 
Diplomat consists of different modules for planning-i.e., the Ministry of Defense- 
and negotiations-i.e., the Foreign Office. The development of different modules for 
negotiation and planning is a characteristic of a good negotiator, according to Fisher and 
Ury’s mod.el [191. They suggest that a good negotiator should do much “inventing”, that 
is, find out new ideas that are not already among the negotiation issues. The separation 
of the planning and negotiation into two modules enables the Ministry of Defense to 
find as many solutions to the problem as possible, without taking into account whether 
or not they are acceptable to the other side. The ideas will not be conveyed to the other 
I2 Diplomacy is a board game marketed by Avaton Hill Company and played on the map of Europe during the 
years just prior to World War I. Coalitions and agreements among the players significantly affect the course 
of the game. 
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side until the Foreign Office decides to do so. Therefore, their consideration by the 
Ministry of Defense can do no harm. 
There are several heuristics that Diplomat uses to decide how to make suggestions 
to another agent. For example, when considering a cooperation agreement with another 
agent, Diplomat designs several possible strategies and compares them to choose the 
strategy that will be a basis for the agreement. Since a negotiator wants to “win”, one 
may suspect that the only criterion that will guide him while comparing and choosing 
between strategies will be his own benefits derived from the strategies. However, as 
has been suggested by the literature on human negotiation, this is not the case. The 
reason for that phenomena is that in order for the agreement to last, it should be 
beneficial to all parties involved. Otherwise, a neglected partner may be tempted to 
reach a more appealing agreement, even without informing the negotiator. For that 
same reason, the other partner should be convinced that the agreement is profitable to 
Diplomat (see [ 191); otherwise he will suspect that the negotiator will later break the 
agreement. 
In order to test Diplomat, we arranged several Diplomacy games, and our findings 
(see [41] ) show that Diplomat played well in the games in which it participated. 
We believe that its success is due to the integration of the heuristic techniques we 
developed for the construction of negotiator agents and well developed informal theories 
of negotiation, t3 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we argue that applying multi-entity techniques, such as game theory and 
physics, to DAI, is beneficial. We described several attempts to apply methodologies 
from diverse fields to DA1 problems. A summary of the multi-entity techniques that we 
used and their application in DAI is given in Table 1. The last column uses the pa- 
rameters presented in the introduction to characterize the problems that we considered. 
For example, we applied game theory in environments where the agents are automated 
and self-motivated, but it is possible that the agents will follow some agreed-upon pro- 
tocols (Sections 2.1 and 2.2). We demonstrated that classical mechanics models are 
useful for task distribution in very large sets of cooperative agents (Section 3). We 
applied operations research techniques such as queueing networks for task distribution 
among a relatively small set of cooperative agents (Section 4). We used the less formal 
social science models of cooperation when there were no strict protocols for the co- 
operation (Section 5), or when communication was not possible [ 15,431. Further, we 
demonstrated that ideas drawn from philosophy can be the basis for the development of 
SharedPlans among agents [ 26,271. 
I3 We have applied other informal models to DA1 situations. In [42], we developed a formal logic that 
forms a basis for the development of a formal axiomatization system and the implementation of a logic- 
based negotiator [ 141 based on persuasion models [ I]. In [ 26,271, we have applied philosophical informal 
models of cooperative activity [7] for situations where teams composed of people and computers plan and 
work together toward satisfying a shared goal. In [ 15,431, we used the notion of focal point introduced by 
&helling [ 58,661, for multi-agent cooperation without communication. 
Table 1 
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Summary of multi-entity techniques and their application in DAL In the last column, SMA stands for self- 
motivated agents, and CA indicates cooperative agents which work toward satisfying the same goal (see 
Section 1) . R&P indicates that the designers can agree on regulations and protocols for agents interaction. s#, 
m# and I# srands for environments with small (handful), medium (few dozen), or large number (hundreds) 
of agents, respectively. AUTO indicates environments with only automated agents, and AUTO&PE stands for 
systems composed of people and automated agents. That communication is possible is indicated by COMU. 
Multi-en&v techniaues DA1 Paoers Characterization 
Game theory 
Strategic bargaining models 
Theories of coalition 
formation 
~inciple-~lgent models 
Negotiation for task distribution 
& Resource allocation in MA 
Coalition formation in MA 
Con~cting tasks in MA 
144,451 SMA, s#, R&P, 
L391 AUTO, COMU 
168,721 SMA, m#, R&P, 
AUTO, COMU 
138,401 SMA, s#, R&P, 
AUTO, COMU 
Physics 
Classical mechanics Goal satisfaction i  very 
Iarge DPS environments 
[701 CA, I#, R&P, 
AUTO 
Operations research 
SPP & SCP 
Queueing networks 
Coalition formation in DPS 
Task allocation in DPS 
169,711 CA, m#, R&P, 
AUTO, COMU 




Persuasion models (logic) 
Focal points 



















There are two main aspects of a multi-entity environment that determine its usefulness 
to a DA1 problem and its effect on the amount of work required for the adaptation of 
techniques developed for it to the DAI problems. The first criterion is the similarity 
between the entities and the automated agents. The second criterion is the level of 
fo~aIizati(~n that is used by researchers of the multi-entity domains. 
For example, people are more similar to automats agents than are particles. Therefore, 
in all the multi-entity techniques that were developed for humans environments, it 
was not difficult to match the entities in the environment and the participants in the 
multi-agent domains. For example, it is clear that players in game-theoretic frameworks 
can model automated agents. It is Iess clear which types of particles in the cIassica1 
mechanics framework serve as models for agents and that collisions are a good way to 
model goal-satisfaction. 
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The second criterion has to do with the fact that we need to provide our automated 
agents with formal and well-designed algorithms. With respect to this, it is easier to use 
techniques from formal multi-entity models than techniques that were not formalized 
by their developers. For example, even though people and automated agents have much 
in common, with respect to cooperation, it is quite difficult to develop an algorithm for 
agent cooperation based on the informal ideas, procedures, and rules that are presented by 
social scientists and philosophers. Much effort is required to formalize these procedures 
and rules and to produce an implementable algorithm for the automated agents. On 
the other hand, after going through the process of modeling a community of agents 
using a classical mechanics framework, the usage of the formal techniques of classical 
mechanics is not so difficult. There is a need to modify the formal procedures and to 
adjust them to the multi-agent requirement, but there is no need to create the formal 
procedure from scratch. 
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